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INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001924

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, AF SE NATSIOS
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: "GUEHENNO IS LYING" ON UNAMID DEPLOYMENT, SUDAN CLAIMS
PROGRESS, COMPLIANCE

REF: (A) KHARTOUM 1906
(B) KHARTOUM 1842
(C) KHARTOUM 1804
(D) KHARTOUM 1787

¶1. (SBU) See para 8 for action request.

¶2. (SBU) In a December 4 meeting with CDA Fernandez, State Minister for Foreign Affairs Al-Samani Al-Wasila decried recent UN allegations that the Government of Sudan (GoS) is obstructing the conditions necessary for the deployment of the AU-UN hybrid force. Al-Samani referred angrily to recent statements that UN DPKO Under-Secretary General Jean-Marie Guehenno made to the UN Security Council - that the GoS has intentionally raised barriers to UNAMID deployment by rejecting non-African troop contingents, failing to provide land for the construction of UNAMID headquarters, and creating operational restrictions.

BOTH U.S. AND UN ON THE GROUND KNOW THERE IS PROGRESS

¶3. (SBU) Al-Samani called Guehenno a "liar" and claimed the reason for the GoS' refusal to allow the Norwegian and Swedish engineers to deploy was that their requests arrived too late, after the TCC composition had been discussed with the UN. Al-Samani said the issue of land for the construction of UNAMID headquarters had already been resolved, and was visibly irritated that Guehenno had publicly stated otherwise. Regarding the equipment delays, Al-Samani scolded the UN for not presenting specifications and prior information about the materials, which in turn led to delays in its clearance and distribution. He claimed that both the US Embassy and even UN officials on the ground know that there has been progress. He recalled the issue of "night flights in Darfur" had shown that Sudan was not lying or intentionally obstructing deployment (Emboffs in El Fasher have essentially confirmed his view on the night flying issue).

¶4. (SBU) CDA Fernandez reassured Al-Samani that the USG understands the difficulties of UNAMID deployment are not entirely due to GoS obstruction (reftels). However it is important to take all necessary steps to facilitate deployment and rapidly approve materials and other items for the mission. This is very important given the very deep lack of credibility that Sudan has on the international stage. CDA acknowledged the USG's awareness of the lack of UN organization in the preparation and deployment of UNAMID.

¶5. (SBU) Regarding troop contributions, CDA urged Al-Samani to convince his superiors "at the very least" to allow Thai and Nepalese units to be deployed soon to Darfur. CDA stated this would be a good way to put a stop to the UN's allegations that the GoS is not cooperating on UNAMID roll-out. CDA said that if the GoS were

to allow these Asian units to deploy, it would gain credibility with the UN and the U.S. at a point when US-Sudanese relations could improve or further deteriorate. CDA warned Al-Samani not to think they can solve one issue and obstruct on another - "don't think you can accept the Thais and then obstruct American companies like DynCorp which are providing logistics for UNAMID and that we'll be happy with this."

SOFA SOLVED FOR NOW, COMMO FOR NEXT WEEK

16. (SBU) Al-Samani responded saying "we must talk about these issues, rather than forcing them" noting that companies like PAE and DynCorp are chosen without Sudanese input but promised to discuss the proposal on the Thai and Nepalese units with his superiors. He said that the Nordics had already been rejected as part of the HSP and were not wanted. There was also the issue of the Scandinavian cartoons on the Prophet Muhammad and the fact that high profile Western troops would be a magnet for Al-Qa'ida. He said that he expected the UNAMID communications equipment to be cleared by next week (delays caused by improper UN paperwork and lack of follow up by them) and that Sudan had cleared up misunderstandings on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the acceptance of the Model SOFA until at least the end of the year. He pulled out the minutes of a meeting with the UN's Muhammad Yunus which showed progress on land use for camps which seemed to directly contradict Guehenno's public complaints.

7.(SBU) Comment: Although reports from the field indicate that UNAMID has made plenty of mistakes that have delayed deployment, it is also clear that the GoS is not doing everything possible to facilitate deployment. The GoS is certainly maneuvering to control the timing of deployment, as well as the composition and capabilities of the Mission. Although the GoS has some valid points

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on troop contributions (the Nordic unit was not among the TCCs initially proposed for the mission) its habit of making an issue out of every step of UNAMID deployment - from clearance of equipment to flight permissions - is certainly not gaining it any points with the UN and the international community. The GoS' passive-aggressive actions will continue to set back UNAMID deployment and ensure that it is a long, arduous, painful process for all involved. Sudanese actions are not helpful, and its long history of dishonesty and delay is a cause for deep skepticism, but the greatest factor for delay is the very cumbersome, clumsy and deliberative process an apparently reluctant UN has for setting up peacekeeping activities in Darfur.

18. (SBU) Recommendation: At the very least, the US and international community should push for the early inclusion of Thai and Nepalese troops since the Sudanese have been vaguely positive about the acceptance of these units. The GoS has no ready excuse for not accepting these units (except that African infantry contributions are over-subscribed and that the Thais are "not needed") and its allies on the UNSC should be encouraged to press them on this point.

The inclusion of these units plus a tactical helicopter element could qualitatively improve the force on the ground.

FERNANDEZ